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Martin: Criminal Procedure - Guilty Pleas - Procedure Prerequisite to Acc

CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -GUILTY PLEAS-Procedure Prerequisite to Accepting a Guilty Plea in Wyoming. Cardenas v. Meacham, 545 P.2d 632
(Wyo. 1976).

The plea of guilty is more than confession; "[i]t also
serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need
be advanced.... It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy."' In effect, the defendant who pleads guilty
enters his own conviction. In so doing, he waives "the entire
array of constitutional rights designed to protect a criminal
defendant against unjustified conviction, including the right
to remain silent, the right to confront witnesses against him,
the right to trial by jury, and the right to be proven guilty
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."2 For this waiver to be
valid, it must be "an intentional relinquishment.., of a known
right or privilege. '"
Because of the significant constitutional consequences
of the guilty plea, the United States Supreme Court has held
that the trial court must exercise "the utmost solicitude"4
in determining that the plea is entered with a full understanding of its consequences; the plea cannot be accepted
without an affirmative showing that it is both intelligent
and voluntary.'
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 116 outlines the
procedure a federal judge must follow in determining whether to accept or reject a guilty plea; its counterpart in
Wyoming is Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.'
Rule 15, identical to the 1966 version of Federal Rule 11,8
provides that:
Copyright@ 1976 by the University of Wyoming

1.

Woodard v. State, 42 Ala. App. 552, 558, 171 So. 2d 462, 469 (1965).

2.

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
GOALS, TASK FORCE ON COURTS 42 (1973).

AND

3. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969), quoting Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
4. Boykin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
5. Id. at 242.
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
7. Wyo. R. CuM. P. 15.
8. Wyoming substantially adopted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
on November 21, 1968, effective February 11, 1969. Federal Rule 11 has
since been amended. Except for subsection 11(e) (6), which took effect on
August 1, 1975, Rule 11, as amended, became effective on December 1, 1975.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370 (1975).
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The court . . . shall not accept [a plea of guilty]
without first addressing the defendant personally
and determining that the plea is made voluntarily
with understanding of the nature of the charge and
the consequences of the plea.
The new federal rule, as amended effective December 1,
1975, is much more detailed. The amendment was designed
to achieve two principal objectives:10 (1) to prescribe the
advice which the court must give to insure that the defendant
who pleads guilty has made an informed plea;11 and (2) to
provide a plea agreement procedure designed to give recognition to the propriety of plea discussions, to bring the existence of a plea agreement out into open court, and to provide
methods for court acceptance or rejection of a plea agree5 the Wyoment. 2 By its holding in Cardenas v. Meacham,"
9.

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370 (1975).
10. Rule 11, Advisory Committee Note, 62 F.R.D. 271, 277 (1974).
11. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(c) provides as follows:
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must
address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of,
and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the
mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and
the maximum possible penalty provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that
he has the right to be represented by an attorney at every
stage of the proceeding against him and, if necessary, one
will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in
that plea if it has already been made, and that he has the
right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right
to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to
be compelled to incriminate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not
be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty
guilty or nolo contendere he waives the right to trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may
ask him questions about the offense to which he has
pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on
the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers
may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
12. The relevant sections of the rule are as follows:
FE. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2):
If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court
shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in
open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time
the plea is offered. Thereupon, the court may accept or reject the
agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence
report.
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ming Supreme Court has incorporated into Wyoming Rule
15 some major provisions of the amended federal rule.
ACCEPTANCE OF THE GUILTY PLEA IN

Cardenas

At his pretrial proceeding, Thomas Cardenas entered
pleas of guilty to charges of rape and of felonious assault.
There had been four counts in the original Information, but
the prosecuting attorney informed the court that two counts
of robbery had been dropped in exchange for the pleas of
guilty.
The court accepted the pleas after determining their
factual basis and after specifically informing Cardenas of
the maximum potential penalty for rape. The court did not,
however, inform him of the maximum potential penalty for
felonious assault; nor did it ask whether the pleas had been
induced by threats or promises or whether the state had
correctly stated the elements of the plea agreement as Cardenas understood them.
Immediately after the court pronounced that his sentences were to run consecutively, Cardenas objected. He had
been led to believe, he stated, that the sentences would
be imposed concurrently. This belief was similarly voiced
by the attorney for one of Cardenas' co-defendants.
THE HOLDING IN Cardenas

In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Cardenas
asserted that the trial court had erred in failing to inform
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(3):
If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the
defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(4):
If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the
record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera,
that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the
defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the
defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.
13. 545 P.2d 632 (Wyo. 1976).
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him of the maximum potential penalty for felonious assault
and in failing to properly examine him on the record regarding his understanding of the plea bargain. The Wyoming
Supreme Court agreed, holding that Rule 15 requires a
record showing that the judge has informed the defendant
of the maximum penalty for any and all crimes for which
sentence is to be imposed,14 and requires, in addition, that
every aspect of a plea bargain and the court's reaction to
it be reviewed at the Bar on the record before the plea is
received."5
FAILURE

To INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE

MAXIMUM PENALTY FOR FELONIOUS ASSAULT

Cardenas claimed that the trial judge's failure to inform him of the maximum potential penalty for felonious
assault contravened the requirement of Wyoming Rule 15
that the court address the defendant personally with regard
to "the consequences of his plea." 6 The state countered with
the assertion that personal apprisal by the court is not mandatory where it can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances that the defendant was aware of his potential
penalty. This must surely be the case, argued the state,
where, as here, the defendant has consulted with counsel
prior to entry of the plea.
Although it is well-settled that a plea of guilty cannot
be understandingly entered if the defendant is unaware of
the maximum penalty to which it may subject him,17 it has
not been uniformly held that the trial judge must be the
source of the penalty information. The question, said the
court in Tucker v. United States," is:
14. Id. at 633-34.
15. Id. at 640.
16. WYo. R. CRIM. P. 15.

17. Marvel v. United States, 380 U.S. 262 (1965) ; United States v. Blair, 470
F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972); Marshall v. United States, 431 F.2d 355 (7th Cir.
1970); Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189 (3rd Cir. 1969); Combs v.
United States, 391 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1968) ; Bachner v. United States,
380 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Ill. 1974).
18. 409 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1969). The Fifth Circuit later adopted the position
that the informed nature of the plea must appear affirmatively from the
record. United States v. Blair, supra note 17.
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not whether he learned of such penalty from the
judge, in a formal proceeding, but whether he had
knowledge as to such matter, whether it was from
the judge, his lawyer, his bondsman, or from some
other source."
The court remanded the case for the limited purpose of hearing and determining whether the defendant knew from some
source the maximum possible penalties for the charges to
which he had entered his pleas. Similarly, the court in
State v. Connor"° stated that:
The question ...is not whether appellant learned of
the range of possible punishment from the judge at
the formal plea proceeding, but whether at the time
he gave his plea he had that knowledge from any
source.... One circumstance which is evidence of
awareness of the range of punishment for an offense is a defendant's prior conviction for the same
offense.... Another... is consultation by a defendant with his lawyer before the plea was entered.2
It is in one sense an appealing argument that the knowledgeable defendant should not be allowed to attack his plea
of guilty on the "technicality" that the trial judge failed to
inform him of fully-known consequences. The better view,
however, adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Cardenas, seeks to eliminate needless post-conviction evidentiary
hearings by requiring an affirmative record showing that
the trial judge has personally informed the defendant "of
the maximum penalty for2 any and all crimes for which
sentence is to be imposed.M
The Cardenas decision was expressly based upon the
holding in McCarthy v. United States,2 in which the United
States Supreme Court construed Federal Rule 11, at that
time identical to Wyoming Rule 15. Although the petitioner
in McCarthy entered a plea of guilty to a crime requiring a
19. 109 F.2d 1291, at 1295.
20. 500 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 19-73).
21. Id. at 304. See also, People v. Miller, 2 Ill. App. 3d 851, 277 N.E.2d 898
(Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
22. Cardenas v. Meacham, supra note 13, at 633-34.
23. McCarthy v. United States, supra note 3.
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"knowing and willful" attempt to defraud the government,
he contended throughout the sentencing hearing that his
acts had been merely negligent and inadvertent. These remarks were found by the Court to cast considerable doubt
upon the government's contention that petitioner's plea had
been made with full awareness of the nature of the charge;
conceivably, he had intended to acknowledge only that he in
fact owed the Government the money it claimed. "[H] ad the
District Court scrupulously complied with Rule 11," said the
Court, "there would be no need for such speculation ....
[P]etitioner's own replies to the court's inquiries might well
have attested to his understanding of the essential elements
of the crime....
Concluding that "there is no adequate
substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the
plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the nature
of the charge against him," 5 the McCarthy Court held that
the petitioner must be allowed to plead anew.
The purposes of Federal Rule 11, as construed by McCarthy, are two-fold: to assist the district judge in making
the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's
plea is truly voluntary, and to produce a complete record at
the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this
voluntariness determination.2" This same construction has
been given by Cardenasto Wyoming Rule 15:
Our holding that a defendant whose plea has been
accepted in violation of [the rule] should be afforded the opportunity to plead anew not only will
insure that every accused is afforded those procedural safeguards, but also will help reduce the great
waste of judicial resources required to process the
frivolous attacks on guilty plea convictions that are
encouraged, and are more difficult to dispose of,
when the original record is inadequate."
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 471.
Id. at 470. [Emphasis in the original text].
Id. at 472.
Cardenas v. Meacham, supra note 13, at 635, expressly adopting the language of the United States Supreme Court from McCarthy v. United States,
supra note 3, at 472.
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Federal Rule 11, as amended, translates the general
edict that the trial judge inform the defendant of the "consequences of his plea" into the specific requirement that the
defendant be told "the mandatory minimum penalty provided
by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided
by law" for the offense to which the plea is offered." Although Cardenas expressly incorporates into Wyoming Rule
15 only the maximum penalty disclosure provision of the
new federal amendment, the decision should be read to include Federal Rule l's requirement that a mandatory minimum penalty also be revealed. Mandatory incarceration is
clearly a consequence of conviction, and Cardenas is predicated upon an insistence that the defendant's understanding
"of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the
plea" not be presumed from a silent record.3"
It does not appear, however, that a plea made in ignorance of a mandatory minimum could be held subject, for
that reason alone, to collateral attack2 Case law has emphasized only the necessity for maximum penalty disclosure,
apparently reflecting the view that "a defendant who voluntarily enters a plea of guilty after being advised of the maximum punishment would have no reason to change his plea
had he been advised that the punishment could be less
2
severe.M
THE INCORPORATION INTO WYOMING RULE 15 OF

ABA STANDARDS 1.4 (c) (i) AND (iii)
While ordinarily the required penalty information will
be provided by the statutory definition of the offense with
28. FED. R. CiuM. P. 11(c) (1). "The former rule required that
determine that the plea was made with 'understanding of the
the charge and the consequences of the plea.' The amendment
more specifically what must be explained to the defendant.
Committee Note, 62 F.R.D. 271, 278 (1974).
29. WYO. R. CRIM. P. 15.

the court
nature of
identifies
Advisory

30. See text accompanying note 27, supra.
31. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING

TO PLEAS OF GUILTY §§ 1.4(c) (i) and (ii), Commentary (Approved Draft,
1968) [hereinafter referred to as ABA STANDARDS].
32. People v. Kontopoulas, 26 Ill. 2d 388, 186 N.E.2d 312, 313 (1962).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1976

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 11 [1976], Iss. 2, Art. 9

614

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XI

which the defendant is charged, additional sentencing consequences may stem from a plea of guilty. Thus, for example,
a defendant may be subject to a separate charge brought under a multiple offender statute, or may receive consecutive
sentences where he pleads to more than one offense. Although
the new federal amendment does not require the judge to inform a defendant about these matters, Cardenas appears to
insist that he must. In this regard, Wyoming Rule 15, as
interpreted by Cardenas, goes beyond the requirements of
the amended federal rule and is in compliance with the more
stringent provisions suggested by the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty."
It seems clear that a defendant subject to additional
sentencing under Wyoming's multiple offender statutes "4
should be told that he faces additional punishment. Cardenas'
requirement that the defendant be informed of the "maximum
penalty for any and all crimes for which sentence is to be
imposed"3 is unequivocal; moreover, Wyoming's statutory requirement that a multiple offender charge be attached to
the information or indictment before the court36 insures that
the trial judge will be aware at the time he accepts the plea
of the additional authorized punishment. This does not
mean, of course, that the court must inform the defendant
that his present conviction might subject him to multiple offender laws in the future. The procedural prerequisites of
Wyoming Rule 15 are designed to insure a knowing waiver
of all the rights which might void conviction in the present
proceeding; 7 the rule does not require the court to assume
that the defendant will be guilty of a subsequent offense. 8
Also implicit in the Cardenas decision is a requirement
that the trial judge explain the consecutive sentencing possibilities where the defendant pleads to more than one of33. ABA STANDARDS §§ 1.4 (c) (i) and (iii), require the court to inform the
defendant of the maximum possible sentence on the charge, including that
possible from consecutive sentences, and of possible added punishment under
multiple offender statutes.
34. WYo. STAT. §r§
6-9 and 6-10 (Supp. 1975).
35. Cardenas v. Meacham, supra note 13, at 633-34. [Emphasis supplied].
36. Wyo. STAT. § 6-11 (Supp. 1975).
37. See text accompanying note 2, supra,.
38. See Fee v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 674, 676 (D.C. Va. 1962).
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fense. This was not a point raised directly on appeal; the
court's holding with regard to review of the plea bargain,
however, included the admonition that every aspect of the
bargain, including any effect on concurrent or consecutive
sentencing, must be reviewed by the court "so that the record
with a
will forever reflect that it was made voluntarily
full understanding of the consequences. '"" Because the imposition of consecutive sentencing is no less a "consequence
of the plea" outside the bounds of a plea agreement, the defendant should be informed of this possibility whenever
it exists.
PLEA BARGAINING-MISTAKEN BELIEF
IN THE EXISTENCE OF A DEAL

In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Cardenas
asserted that his plea was not voluntary within the meaning
of Wyoming Rule 15 because it had been induced by his attorney's erroneous promise that concurrent sentences were
part of the plea bargaining agreement.
Appellate courts are frequently faced with post-conviction litigation based on allegations that a defendant has been
falsely promised by his attorney that a promise as to sentence has been made by the judge.4" The standard of proof
in this area, "formidable in many jurisdictions,"'" was discussed by a federal district court in Mosher v. Lavallee.42
Mosher's attorney had told him that he would receive the
maximum penalty if he were convicted after trial, but that
the judge had promised the minimum penalty if he entered
a plea of guilty. When he in fact received the maximum,
Mosher petitioned to have his guilty plea set aside. The court
expressed concern over espousing a proposition which would
allow the easy invalidation of pleas of guilty. It cited Bullock
v. Warden 3 to the effect that a belief induced by defense
39. Cardenas v. Meacham, supra note 13, at 640.
40. Underwood, Let's Put Plea Disussions-And Agreernents-On Record, 1
LOYOLA U.L.J. 1, 6 (1970).
41. Comment, Plea Bargaining Mishaps-The Possibility of Collaterally Attacking the Resultant Plea of Guilty, 65 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170, 177
(1974).
42. 351 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
43. 408 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1969).
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counsel's erroneous sentence estimate did not render a plea
involuntary, and United States ex rel. Curtis v. Zelker44 to
the effect that a plea made under a subjective mistaken belief was not involuntary unless the circumstances, judged by
objective standards, reasonably justified the mistaken impression. Petitioner Mosher was held to have met the burden
of the objective test announced in Zelker:
What induced Mosher to plead guilty was not merely
an erroneous estimate or expression of opinion by
Nor was it a Subjective misdefense counsel ....
[His attorney] told Mosher
....
taken impression
that Judge Trainor had promised a minimum ...
and the tenor of the entire discussion was such as
to make Mosher believe that this promise had been
made.45
The Fifth Circuit" has discussed the problem facing an
appellate court when a defendant insists that a "promise"
has been breached:
The defendant is often told by his attorney that a
"promise" of a certain sentence has been made in
exchange for his plea of guilty when, in fact, the
"promise" has come from one.., who is in no position to make promises concerning sentencing or has
"probably,"
been made by the trial judge in terms of
"maybe," or "I am inclined toward."47
The court concluded that reliance on the attorney's representation may in some cases render a plea invalid, but stated
that "[T]here must be some basis in the record for an appellate court to find that a 'bargain' has been made which acted
as an inducement and destroyed voluntariness.... [Courts]
are extremely reluctant to go behind a guilty plea because
of mere conclusory statements by a defendant."48
It seems likely that Cardenas would have prevailed under the tests announced in Fronteroand in Mosher. Although
the Wyoming Supreme Court did not pass upon the question
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

466 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1972).
Mosher v. Lavallee, supra note 42, at 1110.
United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 411.
Id. at 411 and 413.
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of whether Cardenas' attorney had in fact made the representation claimed, it noted that it was reasonable to assume
from the evidence in the record that there had been extensive discussion about concurrent and consecutive sentencing,
that Cardenas' allegations of misrepresentation stood uncontradicted, and that both Cardenas and an attorney for one
of his co-defendants had promptly objected to the imposition
of consecutive sentences at the sentencing proceeding. Decision was not, however, based upon this "objectively verified""
lack of voluntariness. Instead, the Cardenasdecision obviates
the need for post hoc determinations of the justifiability of
a defendant's reliance upon the private assurances of his
attorney by requiring that the defendant's understanding of
those assurances be made a part of the record."
Stating that "one of the main reasons for Rule 15 is to
avoid the kind of confusion and misunderstanding that we
find confronting us here,"'" the Wyoming Supreme Court
interpreted the rule to require that the trial court determine,
before the plea is entered, whether it has been made pursuant
to plea negotiations. If this is the case, then:
[the bargain] must be made a part of the record.
The court must... inquire of the defendant if the
purported bargain is as he understood it to be when
making his plea decision. The court must explain
the bargain's effect with respect to maximum sentence and its effect on concurrent or consecutive
sentencing, if that be a part of the bargain, and all
other aspects of the agreement must be reviewed
by the court with the defendant. The court must
make known to the defendant whether there is anything about the bargain which is abhorent to the
court or which violates any aspect of the sentence
which the court intends to impose. If the bargain
purports to improperly bind the court, the defendant should know this and should be told that the
52
court will not be bound by any such impropriety.
49. "The petitioner must bear the burden of showing that the circumstances as
they existed at the time of his plea, judged by objective standards, reasonably justified his mistaken impression." United States ex rel. Curtis v.
Zelker, supra note 44, at 1098.
50. Cardenas v. Meacham, supra note 13, at 639-40.
51. Id. at 639.
52. Id.
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In the absence of this required showing, the defendant must
be allowed to plead anew."
PLEA BARGAINING: THE TREND FROM
SECRECY TO RECORD DISCLOSURE

There has been increasing criticism of the courtroom
secrecy which has traditionally surrounded plea bargaining. 4
Although the practice is admittedly widespread, the fact that
a guilty plea has been negotiated is not ordinarily given formal recognition.5" The resulting courtroom ritual, according to Chief Justice Underwood of the Supreme Court of
Illinois,"6 "sometimes takes a form similar to the following:
Court: [often aware that a promise has been made
and sometimes a party to the agreement] Have any
promises or inducements been offered to prompt
this plea?
Defendant: [usually aware of any promise when
one has been made (always aware of a promise
according to the allegations made in those cases
appellate litigation on this point)] No
which
57 reach
sir.,
Nor is the defendant likely to contradict the prosecutor's ritual denial that a promise has induced the plea:
If the judge, the prosecution, or the defense counsel
makes a statement in open court that is contrary
to what he has been led to believe, especially as to
promises by the prosecutor or his defense counsel,
...

[the defendant] would no more challenge that

statement in open court than he would challenge a
clergyman's sermon from the pulpit. 8
53. Id.
54. Paradiso v. United States, 4892 F.2d 409, 412-13 (3rd Cir. 1973); Raines
v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 1970) ; ALI MODEL CODE OF PRFARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.5, Commentary at 623 (Proposed Off. Draft,
1975); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-

TRATION

OF JUSTICE,

TASK

FORCE

REPORT:

THE

COURTS

9-10

(1967);

Underwood, supra note 40, at 7; Comment, People v. Selikoif: The Route
to Rational Plea Bargaining, 21 CATH. L. 144, 158 (1975).

55.

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 54.

56. Underwood, supra note 40, at 7 and 8.
57. Id.
58. TREBACH, THE RATIONING OF JUSTICE 159-60 (1964).
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The result of this charade is a bargaining process "largely
invisible, informal, and not subject to any systematic
control.""9
One of the several factors which Justice Underwood has
suggested might underlie the persistent invisibility of the
plea negotiation process is the feeling "that plea negotiations
are inherently evil and somehow endanger the validity of
the plea."" ° The constitutional validity of plea bargaining,
however, is no longer in question. In Brady v. United States6
and in Santobello v. New York," the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged both the prevalence and the propriety
of the negotiated plea. In light of the Court's express approval, there has been increasing judicial and critical demand
that plea bargained agreements receive full disclosure in
open court.6
Cardenas illustrates one benefit of such disclosure: by
promoting an honest discourse between defendant and judge,
wherein mistaken conceptions of the bargain can be corrected
before the plea is entered, disclosure helps to assure the constitutional validity of the plea. Because the defendant's
honest cooperation is essential to the fulfillment of this goal,
it seems desirable that the court dispel potential notions that
the bargained plea is somehow suspect by informing the defendant that the United States Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of plea bargaining.
In addition to the correction of errors, the requirement
disclosure serves as a check upon the integrity of
record
of
the negotiation process ;64 protects "the defendant in the event
that a prosecutor does not subsequently abide by his bargain
and ... the state against later false claims of unkept bargains" ;" exposes frivolous appeals; and avoids the necessity
for costly and time-consuming evidentiary hearings.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

ABA STANDARDS, § 3.1(a), Commentary at 61.
Underwood, supra note 40, at 8.
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
404 U.S. 257 (1971).
See authorities cited supra note 54.
Underwood, supra note 40. at 5.
ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.5, Commentary at
623 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1975).
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THE INCORPORATION INTO WYOMING RULE 15 OF
FEDERAL RULE II(e)(2)

Cardenas' requirement of full disclosure is consistent
with the American Bar Association Standards," proposals of
the Council of the American Law Institute, 7 and with the
new amendment to Federal Rule 11," s all of which require the
disclosure of plea bargaining in open court at the time the
plea is offered. The Wyoming court's holding in this regard
reflects the same reasoning that lay behind its decision to
require record disclosure of the maximum potential penalty.
More is at stake than judicial administrative convenience;
a guilty plea cannot be constitutionally accepted unless it is
truly voluntary, and, as the Ninth Circuit has observed:
knowledge of the existence of such an agreement, its
terms and the negotiations which led to it, are crucial to the effective discharge of the court's responsibility to assure that the plea is not accepted unless
it is voluntarily made."
Had the trial court conducted a record examination of
Cardenas' understanding of the terms of the plea bargain,
and had it then informed him that the court had made no
promises with respect to sentencing, Cardenas could have
withdrawn his plea or at least entered it with a realistic understanding of the consequences. In Ecker v. Wyoming,7" a
case handed down the same day as Cardenas,the Wyoming
Supreme Court held that the trial court's "exhaustive voir
dire of defendant before accepting plea makes it abundantly
clear that the plea was entered voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequences."'" The record permitted no
such conclusion in Cardenas.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that Rule 15 of
the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a record
66.

ABA STANDARDS § 1.5.

67. ALI MODEL CODE OF PE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.5(1)
Off. Draft, 1975).
68. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e).
69. Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 1970).
70. 545 P.2d 641 (Wyo. 1976).
71. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss2/9

(Proposed
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showing that the trial judge has informed the defendant of
the maximum penalty for any and all crimes for which sentence is to be imposed, and requires, in addition, that every
aspect of a plea bargain and the court's reaction to it be
reviewed at the Bar on the record before the plea is received. The court's decision, which incorporates into Wyoming Rule 15 significant provisions of the recent amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, should further a policy directed toward minimizing "the escalating
number of cases complaining of aborted plea bargains, involuntary pleas, or frustrated plea expectations," while at
the same time assisting the court in making the constitutionally required determination that the guilty plea is voluntarily
made.
MOLLY MARTIN

72. Paradiso v. United States, supra note 54, at 413.
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